PSAC DISCUSSION PAPER: Collective Bargaining

A series of recent circumstances demonstrate the importance of occasional soul-searching about the way the PSAC conducts it collective bargaining. The on-going review of Regulation 15, the persistent use of legislative intervention by the government, the government’s review of federal public service labour legislation through both the Fryer Commission and the Quayle Committee, and the last round of bargaining with Treasury Board are events which have converged to make close inspection and discussion of our process necessary. This paper is intended to stimulate that discussion, not to provide answers, although some solutions to perceived problems may be suggested.

Regulation 15, the blueprint for the PSAC’s collective bargaining process, sets out a unified approach to bargaining that differs only slightly in its application to a diverse array of bargaining units. As diversity in the union increases, pressure on the «one size fits all» approach to bargaining has built, to the extent that requests to the National Board of Directors to suspend, amend or vary provisions of Regulation 15 in their application to particular rounds of bargaining have become standard.

Recent bargaining experiences suggest that there is a growing dissatisfaction in the membership with the bargaining process. The most recent Treasury Board round of bargaining is but one example of this. There, team members expressed frustration at a sense of exclusion from the process, while many members expressed a sense of complete disconnection from the bargaining teams. Within the teams, occupational group interests threatened to overthrow unit solidarity and played into employer tactics. Similar experiences may be found in the last round of bargaining at a number of airports on the prairies, at some of the new agencies and in some of our smaller, newly organised bargaining units.

These rumblings of discontent must be set against the broader legislative and economic realities. There are real reasons for union members and bargaining teams to feel disassociated from the process and frustrated by the results of bargaining. The 1990s were particularly difficult for public sector unions, including the PSAC. Legislative suspension and/or interference in the bargaining process characterised the decade, leaving many to wonder if the concept of free collective bargaining was dead. It is worth noting that in the 34 years that the PSAC has been certified under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, access to the full range of collective bargaining provisions in the Act were limited by legislative interference for 14 years.* In addition to this, the federal government has not been reluctant to end strikes through legislation or to re-write negotiated provisions to better suit their needs.** There is no reason to believe that this trend will not continue, since it works for the employer and creates little or no public outcry.

If legislative interference in the bargaining process were not enough for the union to bear, mass workforce reductions and the creation of new bargaining units through alternate service delivery initiatives by the government placed a huge strain on the our resources, which have not yet recovered. The devolution of members at Transport Canada to independent airport authorities is but one example of the impact of this: from their original membership at one or the other of the Treasury Board bargaining units, 34 new bargaining units were created that in many cases had to be re-organised, re-certified and have first collective agreements negotiated, all within a four year period. In similar fashion, three new government agencies were created, also requiring re-certification following amendments to the bargaining units and new consolidated collective agreements. All this occurred at a time when overall membership in the union declined as a result of workforce adjustments, leaving the union to deal with greater demands and fewer resources.

In the federal public service, which still comprises the majority of the PSAC membership, all this upheaval created serious morale problems, which the government has determined to resolve through yet another renewal initiative, this time with legislative reform the goal. First the Fryer Commission was established to federal public sector labour relations and to suggest changes, and then the Quayle Task Force was created to further the work of the Fryer Commission, and to implement reform.

While some of the Fryer Commission’s recommendations are welcome, such as the establishment of a single rights redress board, most of the recommendations concerning collective bargaining differ little from the current practice. In particular, the creation of a Public Interest Dispute Resolution Commission to resolve bargaining disputes is little different from the current conciliation process. Perhaps the only significant difference is that this Tribunal, as envisaged by Fryer, would issue non-binding decisions on bargaining that take into account not only the positions of the parties but also the public interest. As Fryer conceives of this process, the decision of the Commission will or ought to make it more unappealing for unions to strike, and for the government to impose legislation that runs counter to the Commission’s decision. The method for achieving this end appears to be the public release of a decision by a tribunal perceived to be independent and working in the interests of the public. It would appear that public pressure is the best weapon that Fryer can identify to resolve or prevent bargaining disputes.

In fact, these proposals are a long way from existence. Nevertheless, even if passed, it is worth noting that nothing in the new reforms or new legislation would or could impinge on the government’s right to resort to legislation in collective bargaining. Experience demonstrates that the government’s use of legislation is no longer exceptional, but is the rule. That being the case, the union is going to have to be more strategic, more focused, and more creative in its approach to collective bargaining. One academic commentator*** on the attack on labour in the 1990s suggested that only where labour united in a broad coalition with non-labour and non-governmental bodies was it possible to fight successfully the government agenda. In his view, it is critical for unions to pursue recognition of the right to bargain collectively as a human right through international bodies, particularly in light of heightened awareness of human rights issues around the globalisation of trade.

If building broad coalitions in support of collective bargaining and the right to bargain collectively are the most effective tools against government intervention in the process, does our current bargaining process facilitate that action? Further, how might such action support the individual goals of particular bargaining units in any given set of negotiations?

In its current form, Regulation 15 establishes a bargaining process as applied to the negotiations of any given bargaining unit. It sets out how bargaining input is received, how bargaining team members are chosen and how strike and ratification votes are held, and the details around all these matters. More particularly, it provides that about six months before the expiry of any given collective agreement, a program of demands is created for that bargaining unit by the Collective Bargaining Committee of the NBoD and attached to the input call to the members via the components. Following receipt of the demands from the members, bargaining conferences are held to review, adopt, and prioritise demands and to elect bargaining teams. In cases of large national units, where both regional and national bargaining conferences are held, actual negotiations would not normally be able to begin until some months after the expiry of the collective agreement.

As Regulation 15 is currently structured, the identification of bargaining issues around which mobilising can begin cannot take place until after bargaining input has been reviewed, adopted and prioritised by the bargaining teams. By the time that this happens, the collective agreement has already expired and bargaining must begin. Consequently, the identification of bargaining issues around which mobilising can be designed doesn’t usually take place until bargaining has already begun and the process has taken on a life of its own. In addition to this, the Regulation is silent with respect to the development of bargaining strategy, so the development of strategy in many instances is team-driven rather than organisation-driven.

During the last Treasury Board round, a Strategy Committee was struck at the National Bargaining Conference with members elected from the negotiating teams, representatives from the National Board of Directors and AEC officers, as well as staff. This Committee ultimately converted into the National Strike Coordinating Committee, but in its earlier incarnation was a vehicle that ensured that the teams were kept informed about the developments and issues at each table, ensured that organisational concerns were addressed and ensured that a strategy to maintain a common front was maintained. While not fully successful in its aims, this round of bargaining was more coordinated than many in the past and perhaps as a result, more able to win public support than many in the past. Had there been more time for pre-bargaining planning, it is likely that support for bargaining would have been even stronger.

If the PSAC is to be able to build broad coalitions in order to build support for our bargaining, it is critical that bargaining strategy and bargaining issues be identified much earlier in the process than the current requirements. Further, while specific group issues are of great importance to bargaining unit members, there is no current provision for the union as an organisation to pursue broader issues at the table unless they come up from the unit’s membership through their bargaining input.

This makes pursuit of such issues as a Child Care Fund, such as we have in our Canada Post collective agreement, more difficult because such demands tend to originate with the leadership of the union rather than the membership, and are rarely priorities for bargaining teams. Yet it is precisely such broad, labour-oriented goals that become the means for uniting members and a broad coalition of organisations. In the current political and economic climate, where education and health are important concerns for much of the population, it is conceivable that bargaining demands around such issues could well unite many groups that do not traditionally support our cause.

It is clear that the identification of such issues would have to be done very early in the bargaining cycle and that there will have to solid support for them, not just by individual bargaining units, but by the members as a whole if we are to build solidarity. This last Treasury Board demonstrated the usefulness of common issues, not just between the tables but also between CCRA, and early in the process, CFIA. While the coalitions broke down somewhat, as a result of differing circumstances, there are clear indications that with some development this could be a powerful force when united around a common cause.

Early strategic planning and identification of bargaining issues would also be helpful in the identification of targets, and in ensuring that weaker bargaining units do not undermine strong ones through early settlement. A coherent, planned strategy sector by sector could identify not only the broad issues but the weakest links, ensuring that we are fully in control of the bargaining agenda.

Long-range strategic planning requires a great deal of work. It requires that decisions about targets and bargaining issues be well-informed, which will necessitate that the decision-makers are provided with research papers on the current and long-range economic situation, current and emerging trends in collective bargaining, as well as employer finances and bargaining unit demographics. It requires the identification of possible coalition partners, both within and outside the organisation, and the identification and/or building of communications links that can be utilised in a communications strategy. It will also require active support and participation by elected officers, activists and members, which will assist in maintaining a united front once decisions are made.

It is clear that achieving this will require resolution to a number of fundamental issues that have arisen over the last few years. One of the more divisive questions is the composition of bargaining teams and how they are chosen, and the other is our method of developing bargaining input. On the first, even before the question of bargaining team composition can be answered, there will have to be some determination as to the level of political involvement the union wants to see in the process. There have been times in our past when component Executive Secretaries sat as bargaining team members; now, members of the AEC are assigned to teams but by practice their role is little more than that of observer. There are, however, those who believe that elected officers ought to play a more active role in collective bargaining and this issue is one that remains to be resolved, especially in light of a more politicised process.

The development of bargaining input is another matter that has given rise to some internal discussion, with the debate concentrating on whether the number of demands should be limited by the organisation, and on whether the union, as opposed to the bargaining unit, ought to have the ability to submit demands. There are some very pragmatic reasons to suggest that it should, particularly in light of the need to plan earlier and more strategically.

There are a number of ways that it can be achieved: rather than holding unit by unit national bargaining conferences immediately before bargaining is to begin, sectoral bargaining conferences could be held, or one large union-wide bargaining meeting could be held on a regular basis, or a portion of the agenda of the PSAC convention could be given over to a discussion of bargaining issues. These discussions should not replace pre-bargaining conferences for individual units, which establish the unit specific demands (although they could replace regional bargaining conferences), but should instead identify the themes and goals that would form the basis for individual demands and the platform for early mobilising both within and outside the organisation, as well as identifying early strategies and targets.

Aside from union-wide strategy discussions around collective bargaining, there ought also to be earlier bargaining unit strategy discussions. One of the recurring themes from bargaining teams consulted about changes to Regulation 15 was their belief that they ought to have a greater role in determining their process. While many believed that teams ought not to be made smaller, or the number of demands limited, there was overall a recognition that the process ought to be flexible in this regard. What has emerged clearly is that what is appropriate for one bargaining unit is not necessarily appropriate for another. It may be that current bargaining team discontent could be alleviated by finding a way to include them or their representative in the decision-making around their own process, including team size and whether demands should be limited, as well as on-going negotiating strategy.

The hard-bargaining climate of the 1990s is not likely to soften into a labour-friendly new decade. That being the case, it is critical for the PSAC to develop bargaining strategies that accept the likelihood of government intervention in the process and find ways to challenge it successfully. If it requires building links to organisations that have not traditionally stood up beside labour, then we must find ways of building them. If it requires the building of new political alliances, we must do it. And if it requires that we examine our collective bargaining process to be able to build better links and forge better alliances, then clearly we must do that. If change is required, we must do it. What we cannot do is nothing.

The PSAC has started a process to focus its next Convention on issues that are a priority for the union and its membership. The politicisation of collective bargaining has been identified by the National Board of Directors as one of the issues that should be on the agenda. To that end, the following questions are provided simply to assist in directing the discussion.

• Do you believe that the process of collective bargaining is currently political? In what way?

• Would politicising the process assist the union? How?

• If you believe that politicising the process would assist the union in achieving more positive results in collective bargaining, what form should it take?

• Does our existing collective bargaining process facilitate a politicised process? If not, what should we do to enhance our ability to act politically in collective bargaining?

• If you believe that it will be necessary to amend Regulation 15 to accommodate a more politicised process, what form should these amendments take?

• Why should collective bargaining form part of the PSAC’s agenda and be addressed by delegates to the 2003 Triennial Convention ? What aspects of collective bargaining should we focus on ? What strategies should we take ?

NOTES

* 1975 - 1978 Anti-Inflation Legislative Program suspended bargaining rights for all workers.

1982 - 1984 6% & 5% legislated wage increases removed bargaining rights for federal public service workers.

1991 - 1993 Conservative government ended PSAC general strike by imposing settlements of 0% & 3% and freezing terms of collective agreements

1993 - 1997 Liberal government extended freeze on bargaining and suspended clauses in collective agreements providing for incremental wage increases.

1996 - 2001 Liberal government suspended right of bargaining agent to select binding arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.

** 1995 Liberal government suspended application of Workforce Adjustment Directive for «most affected departments».

1999 Liberal government passed back-to-work legislation to end strike by Table 2 and to pre-empt a strike by Table 4.

***Adams, Roy J. «Public Sector Employment Relations: Canadian Developments in Perspective», in Gene Swimmer, Public Sector Labour Relations in an Era of Restraint and Restructuring, Canadian Policy Research Networks and School of Public Administration, Carleton University, 1999

 PSAC Discussion Papers  |  Back